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Abstract: This paper explores the social, demographic and attitudinal basis of consumer support
of a Copyright Compensation System (CCS),  which, for a small  monthly fee would legalise
currently infringing online social practices such as private copying from illegal sources and
online sharing of copyrighted works. We do this by first identifying how different online and
offline, legal and illegal, free and paying content acquisition channels are used in the media
market  using a  cluster-based classification of  respondents.  Second,  we assess  the effect  of
cultural consumption on the support for a shift from the status quo towards alternative, CCS-
based forms of  digital  cultural  content  distribution.  Finally,  we link these  two analyses  to
identify the factors that drive the dynamics of change in digital cultural consumption habits. Our
study shows significant support to a CCS compared to the status quo by both occasional and
frequent buyers of cultural goods, despite the widespread adoption of legal free and paying
online  services  by  consumers.  The  nature  of  these  preferences  are  also  explored  with  the
inclusion of consumer preference intensities regarding certain CCS attributes. Our results have
relevant policy implications, for they outline CCS as a reform option. In particular, they point
evidence-based  copyright  reform  away  from  its  current  direction  in  the  EU  of  stronger
enforcement measures, additional exclusive rights, and increased liability and duties of care for
online platforms. This work shows that CCS may be an apt policy tool to hinder piracy and
potentially increase right holder revenues, while respecting fundamental rights and promoting
technological development.
Keywords: Online content service providers, Cultural consumption, Copyright compensation
system, Digital consumption, User satisfaction
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1. INTRODUCTION
Copyright Compensation Systems (CCS) are legal schemes that for a monthly fee would legalise
currently infringing online social practices, such as private copying from illegal sources and
unauthorised online sharing of copyrighted works. Online enforcement of copyright against p2p
networks and their users is ineffective, costly and technically difficult. In the early 2000s, when
the CCS idea had its first wave of popularity, Eckersley (2004), Fisher III (2004), Grassmuck
and Stalder (2003), and Netanel (2003) proposed CCS to replace certain exclusive rights of
copyright holders with some form of collective licensing mechanism, which provides blanket
authorisation for users to access and use works on the internet in exchange for compensation. A
CCS  can  have  many  theoretical  and  practical  benefits,  such  as:  monetising  previously
unmonetised user practices; lowering levels of copyright infringement; reducing costs associated
with  enforcement;  decreasing  the  transaction  costs  of  obtaining  authorisation  from rights
holders;  and  increasing  legal  certainty  (Handke,  Bodó  and  Vallbé,  2016).  Despite  these
advantages, rights holders were hoping that private ordering based on strong exclusive rights
will ultimately lead to the development of successful legal services, while online piracy will be
eliminated through a combination of additional enforcement measures, technical protection
measures  (TPMs),  better  monitoring  of  infringing  activities,  increased  liability  on  online
intermediaries for infringing acts by their users, and increasing penalties for infringement by
end-users.
More than 18 years after Napster, the limits of this approach are apparent. While streaming
services proliferate, the catalogs of audiovisual services remain limited and fragmented, piracy is
still a reality, especially in the audiovisual sector (Poort, Quintais et al., 2018), and looming
large over book publishing. Despite legal developments as well as a significant number of high
profile and arguably successful court cases against individual users and online platforms, the
effectiveness of online copyright enforcement is limited and contested (Poort, Quintais et al.,
2018). The development of case law has also revealed that copyright enforcement can conflict
with the fundamental rights of individual users (namely as freedom of expression, the protection
of privacy and personal data) and online intermediaries’  (in particular freedom to conduct
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business) (Quintais, 2017).
Against this backdrop, CCS proposals enjoy a renaissance. It has been demonstrated that a well-
designed CCS alternative has the potential to increase the welfare of consumers, producers,
authors and artists by hundreds of millions of Euros a year in the Netherlands alone (Handke,
Bodó, and Vallbé, 2016). A recent study demonstrated that certain configurations of CCS are
compatible with the European legal  framework,  and can be arguably implemented without
substantial  —  and  thus  politically  infeasible  changes  —  to  the  existing  European  and
international copyright regimes (Quintais, 2017). In this paper we explore a third aspect of CCS:
its desirability among consumers. Using a survey conducted on a representative sample of Dutch
citizens, we first describe the status quo in how entertainment is consumed via online and
offline, legal and illegal channels in the Netherlands. We then measure users’ willingness to
access online cultural works under a CCS regime instead of the alternatives currently available
to them. We present a model of consumption behaviour and support for a change to the status
quo in copyright compensation. We demonstrate that respondents most eager to switch to flat-
rate license based alternatives are those with the most extensive experience with available legal
digital services. In our view, this finding demonstrates currently unresolved long-term problems
with exclusive rights-based digital content markets, while simultaneously pointing to a solution
to these problems.
2. REVIEW OF LITERATURE
Copyright law is substantially harmonised by international treaties. These set out basic rules and
minimum standards regarding substantive law and enforcement measures, while retaining the
essential logic of territorial protection. 1 EU copyright law is harmonised through a series of
directives that implement the international rules. The InfoSoc Directive recognises exclusive
rights  applicable  to  online  use,  namely  reproduction  (applicable  e.g.  to  downloading)  and
communication to the public (applicable for instance to uploading and hyperlinking), as well as
a number of exceptions or limitations to the same. As a rule, rights are interpreted broadly and
exceptions  narrowly  (e.g.,  private  copying  does  not  cover  downloading  from unauthorised
sources). The Enforcement Directive contains provisions on civil enforcement measures for all
intellectual property rights, including injunctive relief and damages. Finally, the E-Commerce
Directive  sets  forth  liability  exemptions  or  “safe-harbors”  for  certain  intermediaries  and
prohibits the imposition of general monitoring obligations. 2
The  concept  of  digital  “piracy”  refers  to  online  acts  that  under  national  law  trigger  the
application of exclusive rights but are not authorised by the copyright holder, or, do not benefit
from exceptions. These copyright infringing acts do not generate compensation or remuneration
for copyright holders.
CCS proposals emerged in response to widespread digital piracy and the lack of legal offers of
digital content services in the first half of the 2000s. Various authors (Eckersley, 2004; Fisher
III,  2004;  Grassmuck  and  Stalder,  2003;  Netanel,  2003)  proposed  to  solve  this  problem
through a legal mechanism consisting of a blanket license for otherwise unauthorised online use
of copyright-protected content by end-users (a CCS). Such a system could address problems
with  piracy,  while  producing  a  number  of  desirable  effects.  First,  it  would  increase  legal
certainty and reduce the transaction costs of acquiring the appropriate licenses to cover all the
territorial  rights  fragments  required  to  enable  mass  cross-border  online  use  of  protected
content.  Second,  CCS  would  remove  arbitrary  barriers  to  licensing,  leading  to  increased
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competition among digital service providers. In turn, this could lead to better online content
services and wider access to a more diverse range of protected content. Third, CCS would reduce
the direct and indirect costs of enforcement. This would include the costs of private parties with
litigation,  monitoring of  infringing acts,  and other  private  enforcement  practices.  It  would
likewise  include  public  costs  of  enforcement,  including  those  arising  from  conflicts  with
fundamental rights of users and online intermediaries.
From  a  different  perspective,  CCS  proposals  impose  a  cost  on  copyright  holders.  These
proposals restrict the exercise or scope of exclusive rights, such as the rights of reproduction and
communication to the public that apply to online acts by internet users. The restrictions are
accompanied by rules ensuring a corresponding remuneration or compensation for copyright
holders (or solely creators) of works included in the system. The result is that a previously
unauthorised  use  becomes  “permitted-but-paid”  (Ginsburg,  2015).  The  legal  schemes
underlying  such  proposals  vary,  and  range  from  different  models  of  collective  rights
management  (voluntary,  extended  or  mandatory),  statutory  licenses  (accompanied  by
compensated exceptions to the affected rights), and even state-funded systems (Quintais, 2017).
A  contrasting  policy  option  to  a  CCS  would  be  to  strengthen  the  exclusive  rights  and
enforcement measures available to copyright holders. In theory, this would place them in a
better  position  to  fight  infringement  and  transact  with  online  intermediaries  and  service
providers.  Indeed,  this  has  been the recent  trend in copyright  law and policy.  In general,
copyright holders have been successful in asserting new rights in the digital domain (Kunz,
2016),and defining, via court cases, the contours of secondary liability of online intermediaries,
including internet service providers for the copyright infringing activities of their users (Elkin-
Koren, 2014; Angelopoulos, 2016). A recent manifestation of this trend at the EU level is found
in the recently approved Directive for Copyright in the Digital Single Market. Article 17 thereof
(previously numbered as Article 13 in the legislative process) changes the regulation of “online
content-sharing service providers”, defined as online intermediaries hosting large amount of
copyright-protected content uploaded by its users, for profit-making purposes (e.g., YouTube,
Facebook  and  Vimeo,  as  well  as  a  broad  range  of  much  smaller  user-generated  content
platforms). In simple terms, it removes the safe-harbour protection for these platforms and
makes them liable for acts of communication to the public. As a result, they must either obtain
licenses  from rights  holders  or,  if  they  are  not  able  to  do  so,  comply  with  a  number  of
obligations, including the imposition of filtering measures. 3 In addition, as copyright in the
digital domain became better defined, rights holders, especially in the music industry overcame
their initial reluctance, and started to license digital music services selling (iTunes in 2001), and
providing free (YouTube in 2005) or flat rate streaming (Spotify in 2006, Youtube Premium in
2015) access to musical works.
However, despite all  these developments, many of the fundamental problems that emerged
almost  two  decades  ago  persist.  While  a  large  number  of  music  streaming  services  offer
unlimited  access  to  an  almost  limitless  musical  catalogue,  4  audiovisual  digital  streaming
platforms have a harder time to license content in a much more fragmented audiovisual content
licensing  landscape  (Braxton,  2013).  In  addition,  many  traditional  audiovisual  content
producers, who have their own competing distribution platforms (such as broadcast or cable TV
networks) refuse licensing to independent intermediaries, such as Amazon or Netflix, forcing
these newcomers to develop independent content (Macdonald, 2014). Likewise, a combination
of transaction costs and anti-competitive behaviour so far prevented a Spotify-like universal
access to literary works, and other printed material.
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Evidence suggests that streaming services contributed to a gradual fall in the levels of copyright
infringement (Bahanovich and Collopy,2009; Poort and Weda, 2015; Poort,  Quintais et al.,
2018) in certain but not all markets. Consequently, copyright infringement of audiovisual works,
in forms such as illegal streaming services is still  functioning (British Music Rights,  2008;
Swedish Performing Rights Society,  2009; Poort and Leenheer,  2012; Kantar Media,  2012;
Bounies et al.,  2012; Watson et al.,  2014; Poort et al.,  2018). The public and private costs
associated with copyright enforcement are significant (Bomsel and Ranaivoson, 2009). Private
costs  burden  rights  holders  as  well  as  online  intermediaries,  which  need  to  comply  with
increasing duties of care required to benefit from safe-harbours (e.g., those related with notice-
and-takedown measures), as well as with obligations related with enforcement measures for
infringing third-party activities of users of their services (e.g.,  website blocking, notice-and-
takedown or staydown, and content filtering). The public has to face costs associated with the
impact  of  copyright  enforcement  on  end-users  privacy  and  freedom  of  expression  and
information (Bar-Ziv and Elkin-Koren, 2017; Reda, 2017; Urban et al.,  2005; Urban et al.,
2018), cultural diversity (Jacques, Garstka et al., 2018), as well as online platforms’ freedom to
conduct business.
In summary, digital cultural distribution still suffers from significant shortcomings. Individual
users and consumers, who wish to access music, films and books in a digital format, for a
reasonable price, in a legal convenient manner are often unable to do so. Copyright holders
often fail to receive adequate compensation (Cooper and Griffin, 2012; Warner Music Group,
2010;  Kampmann,  2010;  Swedish  Performing  Rights  Society,  2009;  Kantar  Media,  2012).
Therefore, a CCS-based solution needs to be assessed not just for its legal feasibility(Quintais,
2017) or economic impact (Handke, Bodó, and Vallbé, 2016), but also for its level of support
among users,  namely those consumers affected by the potential  introduction of  a  flat-rate
content access model.
Today, digital cultural consumption follows a hybrid pattern: the use of various legal, free and
paid  consumption channels  is  occasionally  complemented by  the  use  of  piratical  channels
(Kantar Media, 2012; Poort and Leenheer, 2012; Poort et al., 2018). 5 CCS can complement or
even fully substitute existing consumption practices — piratical and legal — provided users
consider it an attractive alternative to the status quo.
Previous studies that measured support for some version of a CCS showed substantial demand
for such a service (Grassmuck, 2009).  Various studies conducted before the appearance of
Spotify demonstrated substantial (75%-90%) support for a monthly levy based license, with a
willingness to pay in the price range of €5 to €15, that streaming services currently occupy
(Bahanovich and Collopy, 2009; Entertainment Media Research, 2011; Renkema and Karaganis,
2012; SPEDIDAM, 2005; Swedish Performing Rights Society,  2009).  Most of  these studies
agree that even “pirates” who access content in a copyright infringing manner support the CCS
idea.
Our study adds to this literature in a number of ways. First, using the conjoint survey method,
we prove that it is possible to elicit meaningful policy choices from averagely informed citizens
in a highly complex regulatory domain. Second, this method allows us to test more than just the
willingness to pay for a predefined license. Instead, we are able to rank a large number of
alternatives  and to  measure the part-worth of  legally  and economically  relevant  individual
license components. Third, we look at consumer support for a levy-based CCS alternative in the
context  of  existing  cultural  consumption  practices.  In  particular,  this  paper  addresses  the
following questions:
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Given the variety of legal and illegal, free and paying, online and offline channels, how do1.
Dutch individuals consume music, audiovisual works and books?
How can we explain and contextualise copyright infringement in light of hybrid consumption2.
patterns?
How large is the support for a license-based access alternative? What are the determinants of3.
such support?
How would the introduction of such an alternative upset the currently observable media4.
consumption patterns?
3. THEORETICAL MODEL AND HYPOTHESES
Our theoretical model highlights the factors that explain support for a change in the status quo
in copyright management from the users’ perspective. We model individual support for a change
to the status quo largely as a function of the frequency of use and the volume of content acquired
through different consumption channels across different content types (consumption habits).
Cultural habits depend strongly on individual structural characteristics that include age, level of
education, income and place of residence (Bourdieu, 1984; Poort and Weda, 2015). These have
also been found to determine the unequal distribution of skills and resources that explain the
so-called “digital divide”. Given the relevance of the consumption channel in our definition of
cultural habits, in our first hypothesis (H1) we expect to find that older people present more
traditional patterns of consumption, while younger and well-educated respondents embrace
mostly digital-based consumption habits.
The model also contemplates that consumption habits are affected by individual preferences on
cultural consumption. Music lovers interested in the continuous discovery of new recordings or
in the ability to access an artist’s complete catalogue may be strongly attracted to the search
capabilities offered by online music platforms and archives. In contrast, traditional bookworms
may find an intrinsic value in the process of buying, reading or collecting physical books. In
accordance, our second hypothesis (H2) states that, keeping sociodemographic factors constant,
those having stronger preferences for elements associated with digital consumption - such as a
wider user rights or artists’ catalogues - will be more likely to adopt digitally-based cultural
consumption, whether legal or illegal.
Finally, our model predicts support for the establishment of a CCS (i.e., a change in the status
quo) as a function of cultural consumption habits and preferences. We start from the naive
assumption that the rapid development and adoption of a variety of legal access channels would
be associated with a support for the status quo, since users may be satisfied with the new
services.  Accordingly,  our  third  hypothesis  (H3)  is  that  traditional  and  non-  traditional
consumers are unlikely to choose an alternative to the status quo, albeit for different reasons.
In particular, we expect low support for a CCS among those who do not use digital access
channels in the first place. Given the low level of enforcement in the Netherlands, those who
acquire music, films or books through illegal sources may also find the fee-based CCS option
unappealing. We also expect those consumers who already use legal digital platforms have few
incentives  to  switch  to  a  flat  fee  based  alternative  if  they  find  existing  legal  alternatives
satisfactory.
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4. METHODS AND DATA
This  study  is  based  on  the  results  of  two  surveys  we  conducted  on  the  LISS  panel  6,  a
representative sample of Dutch citizens aged 16+ (including those without internet connection)
in November 2012. The initial sample included all 6,216 active panel members aged 16 years or
older, of which 4,968 (79.9%) completed the choice experiment and responded to all  other
survey questions (Handke, Bodó, and Vallbé, 2016). There is some evidence of potential non-
response bias, given that non-respondents are younger, still studying, or self-employed, still
living  with  their  parents  or  with  their  unwedded  partners  in  larger  cities.  This  yields  an
underrepresentation of ‘digital natives’ in our sample, and an overrepresentation of older people
and respondents  living  in  rural  environments.  Since  the  latter  characteristics  are  typically
associated with a low probability of accepting (or even being familiar with) any CCS option, this
is probably a source of underestimation of the share of digital users in our data.
In the first survey we asked respondents to report their media consumption habits. We asked
questions on the amount and frequency of purchases on various offline and online, legal free
(ad-supported), subscription based and pay-per-use (PPU), as well as illegal content distribution
channels  for  music,  audiovisual  content  and books.  In  the  second survey  we conducted a
conjoint experiment in which the payment mechanism of the CCS was defined as a surcharge to
the internet subscription fee, and respondents were informed that the functioning of the CCS
(including the distribution of revenues) would occur under statutory regulation.
In the conjoint  survey,  CCS alternatives were defined by the combination of  the following
attributes.
Allowed uses covers the rights that a CCS would provide participating users regarding the usel
of content, with three levels of use: (1) downloading only; (2) downloading and sharing, and
(3) downloading, sharing and modifying (including the right to create and disseminate
derivative works).
Subject matter corresponds to the type of content that a CCS would make available, with threel
possible configurations: (1) recorded music only; (2) recorded music and audiovisual works,
and (3) recorded music, audiovisual works and books.
Catalogue completeness. It concerns the scope of a CCS license regarding artists’ works. Itsl
levels are: (1) complete catalogue; (2) temporal restrictions; and (3) partial catalogue, i.e.
catalogues with permanent restrictions.
Monitoring. The monitoring attribute has two levels: (1) any CCS participation is associatedl
with anonymous monitoring; (2) there is a statutory guarantee of no monitoring.
Distribution of revenues. This attribute has two levels: (1) the CCS would provide originall
creators with at least 50% of the CCS revenues; (2) creators (authors and performers) would be
free to negotiate their revenue share with investors or intermediaries.
Price. The conjoint experiment covered six five Euro price points from €5 to €30.l
All the possible combinations of attribute levels would yield 648 different CCS alternatives,
which cannot be tested with a reasonably sized sample. Through efficient factorial design we
created 54 choice sets, 27 for each payment treatment option. Respondents were randomly
presented with 12 choice-sets consisting of two utility balanced CCS options and a ‘choose none’
option.  For further information on the method, especially about the considerations around
measuring price with contingent valuation methods, see (Handke, Bodó, and Vallbé, 2016).
4.1. CLASSIFYING CONSUMPTION HABITS
Our data set contains 28 questions related to the respondents’ cultural consumption habits.
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Consumption is conceptualised in three dimensions: time since the last purchase or acquisition,
the amount consumed, and the channel of consumption. 7
In order to obtain a classification of all respondents according to their consumption, we apply a
clustering algorithm to all 28 variables concerning cultural consumption habits. A clustering
algorithm divides a collection of individuals into a set of similar groups, or clusters, so that
individuals within a cluster are as similar as possible, and individuals in one cluster are as
dissimilar as possible from individuals in other clusters (Manning et al., 2008). Similarity is
measured through the standard Euclidean distance metric. 8
4.2. MODEL OF CULTURAL CONSUMPTION HABITS
Once we get a classification of all respondents into clusters or typologies of consumers, we will
test our first two hypotheses to explain cultural consumption through two types of explanatory
variables:  sociodemographic  and  attitudinal.  The  respondents’  main  sociodemographic
characteristics include age, sex, income and level of education, and of contextual factors such as
household size, and the level of urbanisation of the respondents’ city. On the other hand, we
want  to  test  whether  respondents’  preferences  regarding certain  aspects  of  cultural  digital
consumption affect  their  cultural  consumption behaviour.  Our  data  set  contains  questions
regarding to what extent respondents have weak or strong preferences on the attributes of a
CCS.
Given that our response variable is a unordered polytomous measure (the different clusters
representing types of consumer), we fit a multinomial logistic regression model on the type of
consumer.
4.3. MODEL OF WILLINGNESS TO CHANGE
In our third hypothesis we want to test to what extent consumption behaviour can explain
respondents’ readiness to change the status quo in copyright policy. We measure readiness to
change through a continuous variable that measures the respondents’  distance towards the
status  quo,  which  we  calculate  from  the  discrete  choice  results.  In  the  experiment  each
respondent was faced with 12 choice sets, each of which contain three alternatives: two CCS
alternatives containing a different combination of attributes, and a no-choice (or “none”) option.
To operationalise distance, we take the number of times a respondent chose the “none” option
as an indicator of her proximity to the status quo. Figure 1 shows the frequency distribution of
respondents by the number of times the “none” option was chosen. 32 percent of respondents
(referred to here as “nay-sayers”) opted for the no-choice option in all the choice sets they were
faced with (12),  and therefore are closest to the status quo. In contrast,  29 percent always
preferred some alternative to the status quo (i.e., never chose the “none” option), thus being
farthest from the status quo. In order to operationalise proximity as distance, we just subtracted
the times each respondent chose the “none” option to 12.
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Figure 1: Distribution of times respondents chose the no-choice option in the discrete choice
experiment on copyright compensation systems.
To explain the respondents’ readiness to change from their consumption behaviour, we follow
two different strategies. First, we fit a linear regression model (OLS) of the distance towards the
status quo on the type of consumption controlling for the main sociodemographic factors. To
ease interpretation, the distance measure has been normalised to have values between 0 and 10.
We model the distance to the status quo as a function of the type of consumer, plus a number of
sociodemographic and attitudinal control variables. 9
5. MAIN EMPIRICAL RESULTS
5.1 CLUSTERS OF CONSUMERS
Table 1shows average scores of each variable of media consumption for each of the five clusters
provided by the algorithm. Since consumption data are three-dimensional (time, amount and
channel) the interpretation of the results must take all three elements into account. Let’s focus
on the fourth numeric column of Table 1. Individuals in this cluster are characterised by very
high scores in all time-related variables, which indicates that their last consumption (whatever
the amount and the channel) took place a long time ago (more than one year).  Moreover,
individuals in this cluster present the lowest average scores in all the amount-related measures,
indicating that they acquired only a very small amount of cultural goods. In essence, these are
individuals that almost never consume and do so in small amounts. We have therefore labeled
them as non-consumers. They represent 28 percent of the population.
The first-column cluster represents mainly the occasional cultural consumers (29 percent of the
population). They are low-intensity consumers in both time and amount, but with a stronger
preference for free music (e.g., radio or free Spotify accounts) and certain reliance on physical
purchases. In contrast, bookworms (20 percent) are defined by their low interest in music and
audio-visual content, and by a rather high intensity of book consumption in both time and
amount, which is almost exclusively focused on books in physical format. The third column in
Table 1 represents the smallest group of consumers (6.4 percent), which we call digital cultural
omnivores. They consume through paid subscriptions (mostly music and films), although they
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also  rely  on physical  formats  for  all  types  of  goods.  10  Finally,  the  second-column cluster
represents what we call pirates. These present similar cultural habits to digital consumers (they
are also cultural omnivores), but their main difference with digital consumers is to be found in
their high levels of consumption through illegal sources (see second column of Table 1). They
represent 16 percent of the respondents.
Table 1: Cluster means of the Hierarchical Clustering results (Ward method).
Occasional Pirate Digital Non-consumer Bookworm
Music
Time
    
Physical buy 5.97 6.00 5.72 6.84 6.05
Paid download 6.62 6.16 5.57 7.09 6.80
Paid subscription 6.56 6.24 1.92 7.13 6.88
Free 2.68 3.15 2.53 7.09 6.69
Pirate 6.50 4.00 5.69 7.12 6.96
Amount      
Physical buy 0.90 0.88 1.10 0.39 0.83
Paid download 0.23 0.46 0.91 0.03 0.16
Free 1.67 1.76 2.67 0.04 0.20
Pirate 0.36 2.08 1.04 0.02 0.11
Paid subscription 0.23 0.38 15.41 0.01 0.09
Film/TV
Time
     
Physical buy 5.80 5.25 5.50 6.85 5.89
Paid download 6.95 5.79 5.93 7.07 6.95
Paid rental 6.95 5.37 5.68 7.09 7.00
VOD 5.49 5.28 5.16 7.04 6.87
Pirate 6.97 3.13 5.44 7.08 7.00
Amount      
Physical buy 0.93 1.09 1.11 0.25 0.77
Paid download 0.08 0.49 0.67 0.03 0.05
Paid rental 0.07 0.75 0.89 0.02 0.03
VOD 0.81 0.83 1.15 0.05 0.13
Pirate 0.10 2.60 1.19 0.01 0.05
Books
Time
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Occasional Pirate Digital Non-consumer Bookworm
Physical buy 4.54 4.22 4.17 6.62 2.99
Paid download 6.82 6.07 6.38 7.08 6.59
Paid rental 7.02 6.42 6.81 7.09 7.01
Pirate 6.94 5.64 6.37 7.08 6.68
Amount      
Physical buy 1.65 1.63 1.82 0.53 2.32
Paid download 0.16 0.39 0.53 0.01 0.27
Paid rental 0.03 0.18 0.25 0.00 0.01
Pirate 0.12 0.88 0.66 0.01 0.40
5.2 DETERMINANTS OF CULTURAL CONSUMPTION
Once each respondent is classified as a particular type of consumer (i.e., in a cluster), we can
explore what factors correlate with the cultural consumption habits of each group. The response
variable in this model is the type of consumer. Detailed tabular results can be checked in Table
3, in the Appendix. Model A includes only controls for sociodemographic factors. The effect of
the intensity of preferences can be observed in Model B. To improve readability of results, Table
2 presents the average values of each independent variable for each type of consumer.
The  regression  results  show  that  age  and  education  are  important  predictors  of  cultural
consumption  habits.  Moreover,  digital  consumers  and  pirates  present  similar  socio
demographic profiles. As expected, older respondents present lower chances of being pirates or
digital consumers, and higher chances of being bookworms, than non-consumers. The first row
of Table 2 shows that non-consumers and bookworms present much older average age profiles,
while pirates and digital consumers are notably younger.
Table 2: Average and most common values of each independent variable for each type of
consumer. For education and type of residence, values are column percentages.
 Non-consumer Pirate Occasional Digital Bookworm
Age 60.99 37.24 47.31 40.56 59.00
Median income
(€1000)
1.25 1.25 1.38 1.55 1.55
Average
income
(€1000)
1.36 1.26 1.39 1.56 1.61
Household size 2.28 2.85 2.72 3.05 2.34
Education (%)a      
Primarya 13.64 9.44 7.26 10.85 4.48
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 Non-consumer Pirate Occasional Digital Bookworm
vmbo 39.45 16.09 21.64 12.88 23.02
mbo 22.19 22.61 25.24 23.73 21.04
havo/vwo 6.70 17.02 11.23 14.58 10.83
hbo 14.56 22.74 25.53 24.07 30.42
wo 3.47 12.10 9.10 13.90 10.21
Residence (%)      
Highly
urbanised
11.09 14.67 13.25 17.18 12.05
Urbanised 24.10 28.94 25.97 29.55 26.00
Moderately
urbanised
23.94 24.05 24.14 22.34 23.38
Little
urbanised
23.40 19.57 20.53 17.53 23.27
Not urbanised
Preference
intensityb
17.47 12.77 16.11 13.40 15.30
User rights 2.22 4.40 3.52 4.48 2.83
Types of
content
2.23 4.87 3.99 4.92 3.01
Catalog
completeness
2.21 4.51 3.73 4.51 2.98
Artists
payment
2.32 4.07 3.59 4.20 3.15
a Dutch educational levels refer to: VMBO (pre-vocational), MBO (vocational), HAVO/VWO
(secondary), WO (higher education)
b Value range from 1 to 7.
Also, the chances of being any type of cultural consumer - compared to a non-consumer -
increase with education. For instance, at the same age and similar levels of income, the odds of
being a  pirate  instead of  a  non-consumer will  increase  by  2.3  if  moving from primary to
secondary education (havo/vwo), and they will be 4.5 times higher if moving from primary to
university education. The same pattern holds for the remaining types of cultural consumers,
although the impact of education is naturally highest among bookworms.
The significant combined effect of age and education on consumption habits can be better
observed in Figure 2. The plot represents the probability of being each type of consumer at all
combinations  of  education and age.  11  For  instance,  let’s  focus  on pirates.  At  all  levels  of
education the relative probability of being a pirate remains stable within age categories but
changes dramatically  across them. If,  for  example,  we now focus on the younger group of
respondents, the probability of being a pirate remains high regardless of their level of education;
conversely, that probability remains very low among older respondents at all educational levels.
In contrast, the probability of being a book lover or a non-consumer changes across both age
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groups and education levels.
Figure 2: Probability of being each type of consumer by level of education and age.
Furthermore, the inclusion of controls for attitudinal questions does not change the coefficients
of the structural factors while significantly improving the model fit, which serves as a robustness
check for the analysis. Respondents with stronger preferences for the rights provided by a CCS
are likelier to be pirates or digital consumers rather than non-consumers.
5.3. USERS’ READINESS TO CHANGE
To test our third hypothesis we turn to the regression model of readiness to change in relation to
the type of consumer. The dependent variable is the distance to the status quo. 12 Although
coefficients in the OLS and Poisson models are in different scale, estimates indicate that both
modeling strategies arrive at the same results, serving as a robustness check for the analysis.
In  a  first  specification  we  regressed  distance  on  the  type  of  consumer  without  any  other
intervening factor. As expected, all types of consumers are on average farther away from the
status quo compared to non-consumers. However, in sharp contrast with our naive hypothesis,
digital consumers and pirates lead the way for change, followed by occasional consumers. In
particular, without any control variables, digital buyers are on average 4.7 points (in the 0-10
scale) farther from the status quo than non-consumers, while the distance differential is 3.8 for
pirates and 2.5 for occasional consumers. Figure 3 plots the predicted distance to the status quo
of the five types of consumer (from the linear model) with 95 percent confidence intervals. The
position of digital consumers and pirates is clearly away from the status quo, but the average
position of occasional consumers is also significantly above the midpoint.
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These  same  results  hold  in  the  second  specification,  where  we  control  for  the  usual
sociodemographic factors. Of these factors, the effect of education, income and household size
are significant (see Figure 4),  while place of  residence is  not.  Significantly,  more educated
respondents are more ready to change than respondents with lower educational levels,  but
higher levels of income are associated with lower distance to the status quo, although the effect
is small.
Figure 3: Predicted distance towards status quo by the different types of consumer, from the OLS
model. Error bars correspond to 95% confidence intervals, and the vertical dotted line marks the
midpoint in distance.
Finally, the effect of the type of consumer on the readiness to change holds also when we control
for  preference  intensity,  as  shown in  Figure  5.  This  increases  the  model  fit  substantially.
Although the inclusion of preference intensity in the model mildens the effect of the type of
consumer (coefficients are smaller), the same logic prevails. However, the inclusion of controls
for  the  intensity  of  preferences  dissipates  any  effect  of  sociodemographic  factors,  while
preferences  do make a  difference:  preferences  on payment  to  artists  and types  of  content
present the strongest effects on readiness to change, while catalogue completeness has only a
very mild effect.
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Figure 4: Coefficients of the regression model of distance towards the status quo on the type of
consumer, with controls for sociodemographic factors. Values are linear regression coefficients in
an OLS model, and error bars represent 95% confidence intervals.
In sum, results  support the hypothesis  that different types of  consumers hold significantly
different levels of readiness to change the status quo in copyright enforcement, and that their
openness to change is robust to controls on a varied range of sociodemographic factors and
preference intensity variables. However, the data do not support the naive assumption about the
low incentives of digital consumers and pirates to support a change in the status quo, based on
the existence of digital platforms and low levels of copyright enforcement. On the one hand, the
high level of support for change among digital consumers casts doubt on the assumption that
digital platforms sufficiently meet their expectations in a way that minimises their incentives to
support a CCS. On the other hand, the significantly high level of support that pirates show for
the implementation of a CCS is at odds with their widespread depiction as free-riders who take
advantage of the low-intensity levels of copyright enforcement in the Netherlands.
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Figure 5: Coefficients of the regression model of distance towards the status quo on the type of
consumer, including all controls. Values are linear regression coefficients in a OLS model, and error
bars represent 95% confidence intervals.
A further robustness test to the support for change can be carried out by taking into account the
price of the CCS options voted by each type of consumer. If the naive hypothesis were true,
pirates would prefer CCS alternatives that maximise user rights and cultural content at the
minimum price. But when we look at the average price of the CCS preferred within each cluster,
we observe that digital consumers - who already pay for their cultural consumption - tend to
choose alternatives at higher prices (€11.5), followed by pirates at only slightly lower average
price (€9.9).A one-way ANOVA of type of consumer on average price of chosen alternative
compensation  system shows  that  average  price  is  significantly  different  between  types  of
consumers (F (4, 4863) = 147.4, p < 0.001). Results also indicate that average prices project the
same order as the support for change: those more ready to change are willing to pay more.
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6. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUDING REMARKS
Our research offers insights into how the emergence of  legal  digital  consumption channels
structured the media consumption landscape in the Netherlands. We also discuss some of the
dynamics that drive future change.
We find that nearly half  (48.72%) of our representative sample does not use digital  access
channels to consume music, audiovisual content or books. There are two major holdout groups:
older, less educated people consume very little culture by the means we measured; older, more
educated ones prefer to buy physical books only.
The younger generations show promiscuous content acquisition strategies. We distinguish three
separate  groups  among  them:  digital  consumers,  pirates,  and  occasional  consumers.  Both
pirates and digital consumers are cultural omnivores: they consume relatively high quantities of
content through various free and paying channels. The main difference between is that digital
consumers do not pirate, while pirates use illegal access channels alongside legal ones. Pirates
tend to be much younger than digital consumers, but since income wasn’t significant in any of
our models, we suspect the age effect not to be an indicator of the lack of disposable income.
Digital consumers and pirates make up for 6.36%, and 16.02% of our sample, respectively, thus
they are relatively few. Yet, they are responsible for a relatively large share of the overall cultural
consumption.
The third group - occasional consumers - is the largest of our five initial clusters, with 28.88% of
the  sample.  This  group  is  mostly  characterised  by  infrequent  and  low  intensity  digital
consumption in general. Their use of digital channels is still mainly focused on free sampling,
which is complemented by the purchase of physical copies.
Though a substantial share of our sample uses piratical access channels, there are only a few
who use them exclusively (around 1% for music and films, 0.6% for books). Thus, it is very hard
- if not impossible - to separate pirates from digital consumers. The use of piratical channels is
only one aspect of the digital consumption landscape. Pirates are only a special subset of digital
consumers, who happen to complement their legal consumption with illegal practices. In that
context, the piracy-based argument in favour of a CCS seems not to be the most important.
Our study shows that despite the widespread adoption of legal free and paying online services by
consumers, a CCS is preferred to the status quo both by occasional and frequent buyers of
cultural goods. The more someone uses the current legal alternatives, the more they are inclined
to support the CCS idea, which means that pirates and digital consumers are the most eager to
change. We interpret this support as discontent with the status quo, namely with currently
available legal alternatives.
Our models offer an insight into the possible sources of that discontent. The main source is
revealed when our model includes the preference intensities for two CCS components: user
rights and types of content. Since all alternatives for both components included a baseline, we
are  safe  to  assume that  a  low preference  intensity  means  the  acceptance  of  the  common
denominator, namely downloading only and access to music only. In return, we associate a
strong preference intensity with a preference for more than just the baseline. 13 Since both these
variables yield relatively large coefficients and are statistically significant, it is safe to say that
respondents who reject the status quo want access to content beyond music, and see the right to
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download as insufficient. It is worth noting that piratical access channels (such as The Pirate
Bay) offer exactly these: the freedom to share and access to a wide variety of content beyond
music.
Finally, we can rule out the effect of a relatively low CCS price, i.e., that digital consumers and
pirates prefer a CCS alternative because they see it as a chance to save on cultural spending.
Those who are the most willing to change are also the most willing to pay for an alternative
system. Pirates,  who actively  use the free and unconstrained piratical  access channels,  are
willing to spend nearly as much as digital consumers for a CCS alternative (€9.87 and €11.5
respectively).  That  being  said,  the  preferred  price  is  comparable  to  the  cost  of  individual
streaming  subscriptions,  and  offers  significant  savings  if  the  CCS  covers  both  music  and
audiovisual content.
A CCS is less attractive for occasional consumers, to whom a flat rate would possibly raise the
annual cultural spending beyond their current levels, and convert the internet from a free (i.e.,
ad-supported) access channel into a paying one. Nevertheless, even occasional consumers are
more open to change than not. For them a CCS offers the chance to expand their explorative
consumption  (Bodó  and  Lakatos,2012)  beyond  music  and  into  the  audiovisual  and  book
domains. Occasional buyers are not limited to low income/low education people. Therefore, a
CCS offers  them a risk-free opportunity to explore and experiment with unknown cultural
works, just as the free music services of yesterday enabled them to sample music without risk.
Occasional consumers are apparently ready to embrace this opportunity, even if reluctantly.
As we show elsewhere, a CCS-based alternative would also benefit rights holders, since an all-
you-can-eat flat-rate access model on a societal level would generate substantial extra revenues
for the music industry,  even if  user participation were not mandatory (Handke, Bodó, and
Vallbé, 2016). In certain scenarios, a CCS alternative could increase the welfare of rights holders
and  consumers  simultaneously,  while  weakening  the  exclusive  position  of  current  digital
intermediaries.
All of these arguments seem to support the consideration of CCS as a reform option. At the very
least, this research points evidence-based copyright reform away from its current path in the EU
14of stronger enforcement measures, additional (and broader) exclusive rights, and increased
liability and duties of care for online platforms. CCS offers a way forward to curtail piracy and
maximise rights revenues, while respecting fundamental rights and promoting technological
development. To a point, these goals can be approximated through better private ordering,
namely  improvements  in  pricing,  quality  and availability  of  legal  offers.  Still,  the  complex
fragmentation  of  copyright  across  territories,  rights  holders  and  types  of  use  create  often
insurmountable  difficulties  in  this  respect.  CCS-like  models  provide  policymakers  with  a
blueprint for legal reform alternatives based on statutory licensing (coupled with compensated
exceptions) and collective rights management. These alternatives, we argue, are more consistent
with user preferences in digital content distribution.
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APPENDIX: MULTINOMIAL REGRESSION MODEL OF
TYPE OF CONSUMER
Table 3: Results of the multinomial regression model of type of consumer. Coefficients are in
log-odds (standard errors within parentheses).
 Model A Model B
 Pirate Occasional Digital Bookworm Pirate Occasional Digital Bookworm
Age -0.111*** -0.015** -0.075*** 0.063*** -0.120*** -0.019** -0.080*** -0.068***
 (0.008) (0.007) (0.010) (0.007) (0.010) (0.007) (0.013) (0.007)
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 Model A Model B
 Pirate Occasional Digital Bookworm Pirate Occasional Digital Bookworm
Age squared 0.0002* -0.0004*** 0.00001 -0.001*** 0.0004*** -0.0003*** 0.0002 -0.001***
 (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0002) (0.0001)
Income (ln) 0.013 -0.009 0.018 0.0002 0.008 -0.013 0.010 -0.001
 (0.015) (0.012) (0.018) (0.014) (0.015) (0.013) (0.019) (0.014)
Education
[Ref.
Primary]a
        
vmbo -0.093*** 0.010 -0.617*** 0.472*** -0.041*** 0.028 -0.537*** 0.466***
 (0.009) (0.042) (0.002) (0.027) (0.009) (0.042) (0.002) (0.027)
mbo 0.301*** 0.343*** 0.042*** 0.997*** 0.222*** 0.245*** -0.085*** 0.935***
 (0.013) (0.044) (0.003) (0.021) (0.013) (0.044) (0.003) (0.022)
havo/vwo 0.824*** 0.709*** 0.521*** 1.543*** 0.614*** 0.547*** 0.230*** 1.459***
 (0.002) (0.003) (0.004) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.005) (0.002)
hbo 0.964*** 0.984*** 0.708*** 1.807*** 0.731*** 0.799*** 0.449*** 1.695***
 (0.010) (0.040) (0.002) (0.028) (0.010) (0.041) (0.003) (0.029)
wo 1.513*** 1.274*** 1.343*** 2.216*** 1.101*** 0.961*** 0.869*** 2.062***
 (0.002) (0.005) (0.001) (0.003) (0.002) (0.005) (0.001) (0.004)
Household
size -0.128*** -0.071* 0.064 -0.054 -0.137*** -0.083** 0.051 -0.056
 (0.043) (0.036) (0.053) (0.041) (0.045) (0.037) (0.055) (0.042)
Residence
[Ref. Highly
urb.]
        
Urbanised 0.298*** 0.172*** 0.063*** 0.151*** 0.327*** 0.178*** 0.077*** 0.152***
 (0.015) (0.046) (0.003) (0.023) (0.014) (0.043) (0.003) (0.023)
Moderately
urb. 0.069*** 0.059 -0.312*** 0.076*** 0.055*** 0.039 -0.342*** 0.066***
 (0.015) (0.047) (0.003) (0.023) (0.014) (0.043) (0.003) (0.023)
Little
urbanised 0.117*** 0.045 -0.339*** 0.125*** 0.175*** 0.072* -0.284*** 0.125***
 (0.012) (0.047) (0.003) (0.029) (0.011) (0.041) (0.003) (0.025)
Not
urbanised -0.165*** 0.008 -0.438*** -0.001 -0.122*** 0.026*** -0.405*** 0.005*
 (0.013) (0.052) (0.003) (0.028) (0.002) (0.007) (0.001) (0.003)
Sex         
Female -0.874*** -0.080 -0.622*** 0.414*** -0.819*** -0.032 -0.542*** 0.465***
 (0.019) (0.053) (0.003) (0.025) (0.018) (0.054) (0.005) (0.027)
Preference
intensity         
User rights     0.061* -0.009 0.077* -0.028
     (0.034) (0.028) (0.043) (0.030)
Types of
content     0.259*** 0.190*** 0.272*** 0.063**
     (0.036) (0.029) (0.046) (0.031)
Catalog
completeness     0.122*** 0.083*** 0.090* 0.049
     (0.038) (0.032) (0.047) (0.034)
Artists
payment     0.014 0.029 0.048 0.078***
     (0.031) (0.026) (0.039) (0.028)
Constant 4.619*** 1.847*** 2.516*** -3.052*** 2.962*** 0.903*** 0.737*** -3.736***
 (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001)
Akaike Inf.
Crit. 12,300.5 12,300.5 12,300.5 12,300.5 11,720.34 11,720.34 11,720.34 11,720.34
Note:  p<0.1; ∗p<0.05;∗p<0.01
a Dutch educational levels refer to: VMBO (pre-vocational), MBO (vocational), HAVO/VWO (secondary), WO
(higher education)
FOOTNOTES
1. The main international treaties in this respect are the Berne Convention for the Protection of
Literary and Artistic Works, the 1994 Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual
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Property Law (TRIPS) and, in relation to use over digital networks, the 1996 WIPO Copyright
Treaty, and the WIPO Performances and Phonograms Treaty.
2. See: Directive 2001/29/EC of 22 May 2001 on the harmonisation of certain aspects of
copyright and related rights in the information society, OJ L 167/10, 22.06.2001 [InfoSoc
Directive]; Directive 2004/48/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 April
2004 on the enforcement of intellectual property rights, OJ L 157, 30.04.2004 [Enforcement
Directive]; Directive 2000/31/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 8 June
2000 on certain legal aspects of information society services, in particular electronic commerce,
in the Internal Market, OJ L 178, 17.7.2000, p. 1–16 [E-Commerce Directive].
3. The final version of the Directive was approved by the EU Parliament on 26 March 2019 and
the Council on 15 April 2019. At the time of writing, the final text had not been published but the
approved version can be accessed at:
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/A-8-2018-0245-AM-271-271_EN.pdf. NB:
The definition of “online content-sharing provider is found in Article 2(6). In addition, Article 17
creates a specific regime for these providers outside the hosting safe-harbour in Article 14 of the
E-Commerce Directive.
4. There are very few holdout artists whose work is not available digitally. The Beatles’ catalog
only became available at the end of 2015, and King Crimson’s only very recently (2017). There
are also artists who only license one platform rather than all, or temporarily withhold their latest
works from certain platforms.
5. Considerable time has passed since the date of the survey on which the empirical analysis of
this paper is based (2012). Yet, half a decade later the fundamental conditions of digital cultural
access haven’t changed in the Netherlands. Consistent with other studies on legal and illegal
access in the Netherlands (Poort and Leenheer, 2012), we measured that around 17% of the
population accessed music from illegal sources in 2012 in the preceding year. A recent study
(Poort et al., 2018) reports that 19% of the total population still accessed music through such
illegal channels. While free and paid legal access alternatives became more popular during that
period, this apparently did not translate into a substantial drop in illegal access. Therefore, our
fundamental research question about the consumer desirability of state mandated Alternative
Compensation Systems (ACS) that would “legalise piracy” is still valid.
6. http://www.lissdata.nl/lissdata
7. Time is measured through six intervals, from “less than a week ago” to “more than a year ago”,
while the amount of consumption is measured in five categorical intervals from one unit (album,
film, book) to more than 20, except for paid subscriptions, which are measured as the monthly
household expenditure.
8. Regarding the specific clustering method, we use Hierarchical Agglomerative Clustering
(HAC) (Manning et al., 2008), which compared to flat methods such as k-means clustering, does
not need the prior specification of a number of clusters into which the data must be partitioned.
In order to minimise the within-cluster variance we use Ward’s minimum variance method
(Ward, 1963). In the end, each respondent is classified exclusively into one cluster.
9. Although our raw measure of distance is a continuous variable, it is actually bounded count
data — with strict integer value range [0, 12]. In addition, this variable is zero-inflated. Modeling
variation of this kind of data through linear models may cause estimation problems, given that
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OLS assumes that values are normally distributed and that the response variable can take any
real value (Cameron and Trivedi, 1998). Count data can be better modeled through log-linear
regression models that assume more realistic distributions in the response data, such as Poisson
(Gelman and Hill, 2007). To that effect, we run robustness checks fitting a Poisson regression
model to explain variation in distance to the status quo as a function of the type of consumer,
with robust, heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors for the parameter estimates (Zeileis,
2006).
10. The expression “cultural omnivores” intends to convey a wide variety of channels of cultural
consumption rather than an intense or voluminous cultural consumption pattern.
11. For the sake of visualisation, age has been recoded into a categorical variable with 10-year
interval categories.
12. Due to space limits, complete tabular results of both OLS and Poisson regression may be
available upon request.
13. Unless we assume theoretically that respondents have a strong preference for the option that
offers them less.
14. See Section 2 supra, in particular Article 17 of the Copyright in the Digital Single Market
Directive .
